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GONE BUT NOT FORGOTTEN: HOW SECTION
212(C) RELIEF CONTINUES TO DIVIDE COURTS
PRESIDING OVER INDICTMENTS FOR ILLEGAL
REENTRY
Anthony Distinti*
INTRODUCTION
In 1982, twelve-year-old Richard Copeland immigrated to the United
States from Jamaica and became a lawful permanent resident.' He lived
with his grandmother 2 and showed academic promise.3 In high school,
Copeland began dating a female United States citizen.4  The couple
eventually moved in together and had two children, whom Copeland helped
support.5
Copeland's life had a darker side, however. By 1995, he had been
convicted of four New York State crimes: disorderly conduct, attempted
criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree, and criminal possession of a
weapon in the second degree. 6 Furthermore, the circumstances behind
Copeland's fourth conviction were extremely violent. Copeland had pulled
a man from a car at gunpoint, demanded money, and shot the man in the
throat when he tried to escape.7 Each time the police arrested Copeland, he
gave false names, social security numbers, or birth dates. 8 Based on
Copeland's conviction for attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance,
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Professor Jennifer
Gordon and to Dan Kesselbrenner, Director of the National Immigration Project, for their
extremely helpful guidance. Thanks to those close to me for their support and patience
during the writing process.
1. United States v. Copeland (Copeland I1), 376 F.3d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 2004). Lawful
permanent residents ("LPRs") are "'aliens lawfully admitted [into the United States] for
permanent residence."' Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy
238 (4th ed. 2005). LPRs receive green cards, are permitted to work in the United States,
and qualify for certain government-subsidized benefits. Id.
2. CopelandI1, 376 F.3d at 62.
3. United States v. Copeland (Copeland Il), 369 F. Supp. 2d 275, 312-13 (E.D.N.Y.
2005), on remand from Copeland Il, 376 F.3d 61.
4. Id. at279,319.
5. Id. at 319-20.
6. Copelandll, 376 F.3d at 62-63.
7. Id. at 63.
8. Id. at 62.
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the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") 9 initiated deportation' 0
proceedings against him. 11 Copeland's deportation hearings took place
before an immigration judge ("IJ") in August and November of 1996.12
Before September 30, 1996, an immigrant in Copeland's situation could
have applied for a type of relief from deportation commonly called "section
212(c) relief." To receive section 212(c) relief, an alien in a deportation
proceeding had to (1) demonstrate that social and humane considerations
outweighed his undesirability as a permanent resident and (2) convince an
IJ to make the discretionary decision to grant the relief'13 If granted,
section 212(c) relief entitled the alien to remain in the United States as a
lawful permanent resident ("LPR"). 14 When Copeland's case came before
an IJ in November 1996,15 however, the status of section 212(c) relief in
cases such as his was in doubt. 16 The confusion began earlier that year
when Congress passed two amendments to the Immigration and Nationality
Act 17 ("INA"): the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
199618 ("AEDPA") and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 199619 ("IIRIRA") (collectively, "the 1996
Amendments"). The U.S. Attorney General insisted that the amendments
retroactively eliminated section 212(c) relief, but some courts disagreed.20
The IJ overseeing Copeland's deportation proceeding took the Attorney
General's position and refused to consider Copeland for section 212(c)
relief.2'
9. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as
amended in various sections of 5, 6, 18, 44, and 49 U.S.C.), dissolved the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") and gave its responsibilities to the newly created Department
of Homeland Security ("DHS"). R. Blake Chisam & Robert C. Divine, Immigration Practice
§ 2-2, at 2-2 to -3 (2005-06 ed. 2005).
10. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in various
sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.), changed the word "deportation" to "removal." INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289, 315 (2001); see also Anna Marie Gallagher, Immigration Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: A Primer on What Crimes Can Get Your Client into Trouble, in 1
Immigration and Nationality Law Handbook 132, 132 (Randy P. Auerbach et al. eds., 2003).
Because this Note discusses immigration law before and after the passage of IIRIRA, the
word "deportation" will be used throughout the Note for consistency.
11. Copeland 11, 376 F.3d at 63.
12. Id.
13. See Main, 16 1. & N. Dec. 581, 584 (B.I.A. 1978).
14. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 295. For a brief definition of an LPR, see supra note 1.
15. Copeland If, 376 F.3d at 63-64. The waiver was called "section 212(c) relief' after
its section in the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163,
187 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994)) (repealed 1996).
16. Copeland 11, 376 F.3d at 64-65.
17. 66 Stat. 163.
18. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in various sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42
U.S.C.).
19. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in various sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
20. See Copelandl, 376 F.3d at 64-65.
21. Id. at64.
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Copeland was subsequently deported,22 and he returned to the United
States in 1999 without permission from the govemment. 23 As a result,
Copeland was indicted for the crime of illegal reentry pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326.24 By the time Copeland appeared in federal court to face the
charge, however, the U.S. Supreme Court had held in INS v. St. Cyr25 that
AEDPA and IIRIRA did not retroactively eliminate section 212(c) relief.26
It was thus apparent that the IJ presiding over Copeland's original
deportation proceeding in 1996 had incorrectly interpreted the law and that
Copeland should have been considered for relief.2 7 Consequently, the
federal district court presiding over Copeland's 1999 case faced two
pressing questions: Could Copeland claim successfully that the IJ's failure
to consider him for section 212(c) relief made his earlier deportation order
unfair? If so, should the court vacate his indictment for illegal reentry
because the indictment depends on an unfair administrative order?
These questions have not been unique to Richard Copeland's case. Since
the Supreme Court's St. Cyr decision, several courts have grappled with
them and have produced different answers. 28 Part I of this Note describes
the legislation underlying these questions and how the passage of AEDPA
and IIRIRA created confusion in criminal reentry cases where the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") or an IJ failed to consider a potentially
eligible alien for section 212(c) relief during his deportation. Part II
explains the different conclusions of circuit courts trying to resolve whether
an alien indicted for criminal illegal reentry can collaterally attack his
deportation order by arguing that a failure to consider him for section
212(c) relief was fundamentally unfair under § 1326(d)(3). Part III argues
that such a failure should be considered fundamentally unfair, so long as the
alien can prove that he had a plausible ground for relief at the time of his
deportation. If the alien satisfies this burden, a court should vacate his
indictment for illegal reentry.
I. THE BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT QUESTIONS ABOUT SECTION
212(c) RELIEF
Some background information is necessary to understand how section
212(c) relief, which was eliminated almost ten years ago, continues to
trouble courts presiding over criminal reentry cases. Accordingly, Part L.A
offers relevant immigration law, including the basic principles behind
deportation, the deportation procedures for criminal aliens such as Richard
22. Id.
23. CopelandlIl, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
24. See id. A deported alien who reenters the country without permission from the
Attorney General is subject to civil and criminal penalties. For a discussion of these
penalties, see infra Part l.A.3.a.
25. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
26. Id. at 325-26.
27. See Copelandl, 276 F.3d at 71.
28. See id. at 70-71 (citing circuit court cases confronting these questions).
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Copeland, and the penalties for reentry after deportation. Part I.B then
specifies how section 212(c) was applied before its elimination and how a
past failure of the BIA or an IJ to consider an alien for section 212(c) relief
creates problems for courts today.
A. Relevant Immigration Law
The following summaries focus on areas of immigration law that have a
large impact on aliens such as Richard Copeland. Part I.A. 1 describes the
basic principles behind deportation. Part I.A.2 provides some of the basic
deportation procedures for criminal aliens. Part I.A.3 summarizes the crime
of illegal reentry.
1. The Basic Principles Behind Deportation
Congress determines immigration law and has plenary power to do so:
"'[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more
complete."' 29 Congress first began restricting immigration in 1875,30 and it
granted the executive the responsibility for administering immigration
laws. 31 The executive has established agencies to accomplish this task, and
as a result, deportations are regulated by both federal laws and agency
regulations. 32
A deportation is a civil proceeding, and consequently, deportable aliens
do not possess the same due process protections as criminal defendants. 33
The Supreme Court views deportation not as a punishment, but as a
prospective look at an alien's "right to remain in this country in the
future." 34  Historically, the Court has been very deferential toward
Congress's immigration power,35 but the Court's deference has not been
29. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)); see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of
Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 925, 926
(1995). For a discussion characterizing United States immigration policy as "schizophrenic"
since the ratification of the Constitution, see James F. Smith, A Nation that Welcomes
Immigrants? An Historical Examination of United States Immigration Policy, 1 U.C. Davis
J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 227, 228 (1995).
30. Tisha R. Tallman, Liberty, Justice, and Equality: An Examination of Past, Present,
and Proposed Immigration Policy Reform Legislation, 30 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 869,
883 (2005).
31. See Chisam & Divine, supra note 9, § 2-1, at 2-1.
32. See Tim Schepers, Note, Does the Punishment Fit the Crime? U.S. Alien
Deportation and the Requirement of Acceptance in Jama v. I.N.S., 28 Hamline L. Rev. 389,
399 (2005) ("Alien removal is regulated by both federal law and INS agency procedure and
enforced by the Attorney General through INS adjudicative functions.").
33. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 324 (2001).
34. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).
35. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) ("Our cases 'have long recognized
the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the
Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control."' (quoting
Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953), and citing, among other cases, Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), and The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581
(1889))); see also Legomsky, supra note 29, at 926.
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absolute in recent decades. 36 For example, the Court has held that aliens
residing in the United States and resident aliens returning to the country are
entitled to certain procedural due process rights not accorded to aliens
seeking initial admission.37 In Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,38 the Supreme
Court held that a resident alien who faces a deportation proceeding is
entitled to notice of the nature of the deportation charge, a hearing at least
before an executive or administrative tribunal, and a fair opportunity to be
heard. 39 In United States v. Mendoza-Lopez,40 the Court held that an alien
indicted for criminal illegal reentry has the right to collaterally attack his
initial deportation order.41 If the alien proves that the deportation order
violated his rights, the court must throw out the indictment for illegal
reentry.42 Mendoza-Lopez also recognized that a deportation hearing might
contain procedural errors "so fundamental that they may functionally
deprive the alien of judicial review, requiring that the result of the hearing
in which they took place not be used to support a criminal conviction." 43
The Court, however, expressly declined to enumerate those procedural
errors.
44
36. Legomsky, supra note 29, at 926 ("In the early years, this principle of plenary
congressional authority over immigration was often expressed in absolute terms; the
suggestion was that courts had literally no power to review the constitutionality of
Congress's actions. In later years the Court began to hedge, leaving open the possibility of
some judicial role in assessing the constitutionality of federal immigration statutes."); cf
Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and
Judicial Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1615, 1616 (2000) (suggesting that there is a "clear though
qualified pattern of genuine discomfort-on the parts of both Congress and the judiciary-
with the notion of a significant judicial role in immigration matters" and noting that under
Congress's plenary immigration power, "when someone challenges the constitutionality of
an immigration statute, the courts accord Congress unusually great deference, at or
approaching nonreviewability").
37. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal
Regulation ofAliens and the Constitution, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 862, 867 (1989) ("Under current
doctrine, aliens seeking to enter the United States for the first time are entitled only to those
procedures Congress decides to provide; resident aliens whom the Government seeks to
deport, however, are accorded fairly substantial due process protections."). But see Raquel
Aldana & Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, "Aliens" in Our Midst Post-9/11: Legislating
Outsiderness Within the Borders, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1683, 1700 (2005) (book review)
(noting the argument that the Supreme Court "has steadily chopped away at the
constitutional protections of U.S. citizens who seem to have a 'foreign appearance').
38. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
39. Id. at 597-98.
40. 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
41. Id. at 837-39.
42. Id. at 842.
43. Id. at 839 n.17.
44. Id. For a list of other procedural due process rights established by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the context of deportations, see Julie K. Rannik, Comment, The Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Death Sentence for the 212(c) Waiver, 28 U. Miami
Inter-Am. L. Rev. 123, 132 n.52 (1996).
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2. Basic Deportation Procedures for Criminal Aliens
To understand the procedural history of a case such as Copeland's, it is
necessary to review some of the history and practices of the agencies
responsible for executing deportations. When Copeland appeared before an
IJ, the INS was the executive agency responsible for deporting aliens.45 It
was part of the Department of Justice, headed by the Attorney General, and
it was charged with enforcing immigration laws.46 The Homeland Security
Act of 2002,4 7 however, dissolved the INS. 48 The act charged the newly
created Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") with the task of
deporting aliens, but the Attorney General retained some of his immigration
responsibilities. 49 Among these responsibilities is overseeing the Executive
Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"). 50 The EOIR includes the BIA
and the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, which manages the nation's
immigration courts and judges.51 The Attorney General is also the ultimate
authority for interpreting "all questions of law" in immigration matters. 52
Once an alien such as Copeland has been convicted of a deportable
criminal offense, deportation proceedings are to begin "as expeditiously as
possible." 53 Deportable crimes "have historically been defined broadly. '54
45. See Robert C. Divine, Immigration Practice § 2-2(f), at 2-8 (2002).
46. Id. §§ 2-2, at 2-1 to -3, 2-2(f), at 2-8.
47. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as
amended in various sections of 5, 6, 18, 44, and 49 U.S.C.).
48. See Chisam & Divine, supra note 9, § 2-2, at 2-2.
49. See Homeland Security Act of 2002 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 108-7, Division L, §
105, 117 Stat. 11, 526-32 (2003) (amending scattered sections of 6, 8, and 42 U.S.C.);
Chisam & Divine, supra note 9, § 2-2, at 2-3 & n.6.
50. Chisam & Divine, supra note 9, § 2-2, at 2-3.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 2-2, at 2-2 n.6.
53. See INA § 239(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(d)(1) (2000) ("In the case of an alien who is
convicted of an offense which makes the alien deportable, the Attorney General shall begin
any removal proceedings as expeditiously as possible after the date of the conviction."). If
the DHS or the Attorney General does not discover that the alien is deportable, the alien can
continue to live in the United States once he is released from prison. Chisam & Divine,
supra note 9, § 11-3(h), at 11-23.
54. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295 & n.4 (2001); cf Gallagher, supra note 10, at 132
("Since the early days of the republic, the United States government has made efforts and
passed laws to limit and exclude the admission and residency of criminal convicts and
'dangerous aliens."'). One example of an ever-broadening deportable offense is the
"aggravated felony." Congress introduced this criminal category in the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-70 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43) (2000)); see Yen H. Trinh, Note, The Impact of New Policies Adopted After
September II on Lawful Permanent Residents Facing Deportation Under the AEDPA and
I1RIRA and the Hope of Relief Under the Family Reunification Act, 33 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp.
L. 543, 550 (2005). Aggravated felonies are defined by statute. See generally Gallagher,
supra note 10, at 134-39. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 originally stipulated that
murder, rape, and sexual abuse of minors constituted aggravated felonies, but subsequent
statutes throughout the 1990s added more crimes. Id. at 134-35. Aggravated felonies
currently include illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 101(a)(43)(B), illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices, INA § 101(a)(43)(C),
8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)(C), offenses involving fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim
2814 [Vol. 74
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If an alien must serve time for his conviction, the DHS can deport him once
he completes his term of imprisonment. 55 Certain nonviolent offenders,
however, can be deported earlier than their release dates. 56
Most deportation proceedings are overseen by an IJ.57 In general, the
government bears the burden of showing deportability by "clear,
convincing and unequivocal evidence." 58 An alien has no right to counsel
during a deportation proceeding, 59 but an IJ owes special duties to pro se
aliens.60 Within thirty days of an U's decision, either party may appeal to
the BIA.61 Consisting of eleven board members, the BIA is the highest
administrative body responsible for interpreting and applying immigration
or victims exceeds $10,000, INA § 101(a)(43)(M), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(M), and an act of
violence resulting in a sentence of at least one year, INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. §
1 101(a)(43)(F). A crime of violence is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16 as "(a) an offense that has
as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may
be used in the course of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2000). Another broad
deportable offense is a crime of "moral turpitude." Brian C. Harms, Redefining "Crimes of
Moral Turpitude": A Proposal to Congress, 15 Geo. lmmigr. L.J. 259, 259 (2001). The
Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, introduced this deportable offense, but
Congress left the task of defining moral turpitude to the courts. Harms, supra, at 259.
"[W]hether illegal conduct constitutes moral turpitude often depends on the unique
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. . . [and] what constitutes such a
crime in one state may not in another state." Jay Wilson, The Definitional Problems with
"Moral Turpitude," 16 J. Legal Prof. 261, 264-65 (1991). Nevertheless, moral turpitude
"'refers generally to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the
accepted rules of morality."' Gallagher, supra note 10, at 134 (quoting Franklin, 20 1. & N.
Dec. 867, 868 (B.I.A. 1994), aff'd, Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995)). Currently,
an immigration judge ("I") can deport an LPR for one crime of moral turpitude if the crime
occurred within five years of entry and resulted in imprisonment for at least one year. 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000). If the alien's LPR status is pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(j),
the five year threshold extends to ten years. See id. An LPR is deportable at any time if
convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude, so long as the crimes do not "aris[e] out of a
single scheme of criminal misconduct." Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
55. Chisam & Divine, supra note 9, § 11-3(g), at 11-21. The DHS must take almost all
imprisoned criminal aliens into custody once they have completed their criminal sentences.
Id.
56. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(4)(B); Chisarn & Divine, supra note 9, § 11-3(g), at 11-21.
57. Chisam & Divine, supra note 9, § 2-2(g), at 2-17. "[Flederal judges trying aliens in
all criminal cases [possess] the power to enter an order of removal at the time of criminal
sentencing rather than wait for normal Immigration Court removal proceedings...." Id. §
S11-4(i), at 11-45.
58. See id. § 11-2, at 11-4.
59. See id. § l1-3(e), at II-12.
60. Copeland H, 376 F.3d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 2004). A pro se alien is one who represents
himself, i.e., appears before an IJ without a lawyer. See Black's Law Dictionary 1258 (8th
ed. 2004).
61. Chisam & Divine, supra note 9, § 11-6, at 11-77, -78 ("Enforcement of a removal
order is automatically stayed during an alien's time to appeal and during the pendency of any
appeal to the [Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")], except as to (1) a custody or bond
determination or (2) an order denying a motion to reopen or reconsider (except a motion to
reopen an in absentia order) unless the Board grants a motion for stay.").
2006] 2815
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law. 62 The BIA reviews an IJ's factual findings under the "clearly
erroneous" standard and reviews an 's conclusions of law de novo.63 The
Attorney General names the BIA board members, defines its jurisdiction,
possesses the power to dissolve it, and can reverse any of its decisions. 64
At the time of Copeland's deportation, federal court review of a BIA
decision was often available.65 Under certain circumstances, an alien could
appeal a BIA decision directly to the court of appeals of the circuit in which
the IJ held the proceeding. 66 An incarcerated alien could also file a habeas
petition in the district court, so long as the petition asserted only certain
claims. 67
3. A Potential Consequence of Returning to the United States After
Deportation: Prosecution for the Crime of Illegal Reentry
Immigration law prohibits deported aliens such as Richard Copeland
from returning to the United States without the permission of the Attorney
General. 68 As Part I.A.3.a discusses, aliens who reenter the country without
permission can face severe consequences. Nevertheless, as Part I.A.3.b
describes, the Supreme Court has allowed aliens to defend against these
consequences by collaterally attacking their deportation orders.
a. Illegal Reentry as a General Matter
If a previously deported alien is found in the United States without the
permission of the Attorney General, he is subject to both civil and criminal
62. United States Department of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals,
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
63. Chisam & Divine, supra note 9, § 11-6, at 11-81; see Rannik, supra note 44, at 137-
38 ("The BIA was given authority to review discretionary decisions of immigration judges
de novo in order to ensure uniformity of decision-making regarding Section 212(c)
waivers."). De novo review is a "nondeferential review of an administrative decision."
Black's Law Dictionary 864 (8th ed. 2004).
64. Legomsky, supra note 36, at 1630.
65. See Chisam & Divine, supra note 9, § 2-2(h), at 2-36 ("Many DHS and Immigration
Court decisions are subject to some kind of appeal to or review in the federal courts, as long
as the administrative remedies (appeals) available have been exhausted or some other basis
for federal court jurisdiction is available." (footnote omitted)).
66. INA § 242(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2000); see also Legomsky, supra note 36,
at 1623-24 ("In 1961, Congress made petitions for review in the courts of appeals the 'sole
and exclusive' procedure for obtaining judicial review of administratively final deportation
orders, except that habeas corpus was still permitted for aliens in custody. Concerned by
tales of long delays in executing deportation orders, Congress thought that the combination
of district court review of the agency action and court of appeals review of the district court
decision was slower and more cumbersome than a one-stop review process in the court of
appeals."); see also Rannik, supra note 44, at 137-38 ("Decisions of the BIA were
reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard and were upheld rby the courts of appeals]
unless found arbitrary or capricious. The mere fact that the BIA may have reached a
different result was inconsequential.").
67. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (listing the limits on habeas petition claims).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 846 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
2816 [Vol. 74
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penalties. The civil penalties occur immediately and include detention and
deportation. 69 The criminal penalties are triggered if the alien is prosecuted
successfully for illegal reentry, which is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1326.70 If
an alien is convicted of illegal reentry, § 1326 imposes, at a minimum, fines
and/or imprisonment for two years.71 Reentering aliens convicted of certain
crimes before deportation can suffer higher penalties. 72 For example,
because Richard Copeland committed an aggravated felony73 before his
deportation, a conviction for illegal reentry could have earned him up to
twenty years in prison.74
Having now introduced illegal reentry, Part I.A.3.b describes a potential
defense against such a charge.
69. See Chisam & Divine, supra note 9, § 10-6(f), at 11-67 to -68 (describing how an
alien may be deported for past immigration-related violations, such as reentering after a prior
deportation); id § 11-3(f), at 11-16 (describing how the DHS may detain a potentially
deportable alien).
70. For a summary of the historical development of the crime of illegal reentry, see
Brent S. Wible, The Strange Afterlife of Section 212(c) Relief" Collateral Attacks on
Deportation Orders in Prosecutions for Illegal Reentry After St. Cyr, 19 Geo. Immigr. L.J.
455, 457 (2005).
71. The statute provides the following:
[A]ny alien who-
(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding, and thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States,
unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the United States or
his application for admission from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney
General has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for admission; or
(B) with respect to an alien previously denied admission and removed, unless
such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain such advance
consent under this chapter or any prior Act,
shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2000).
72. For example,
(b) Criminal penalties for reentry of certain removed aliens
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the case of any alien
described in such subsection-
(1) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of three
or more misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against the person, or both, or
a felony (other than an aggravated felony), such alien shall be fined under title
18, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both;
(2) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an
aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined under such title, imprisoned not
more than 20 years, or both ....
8 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
73. See supra note 54 for a discussion of aggravated felonies.
74. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2); United States v. Copeland (Copeland 1), 228 F. Supp. 2d
267,270 (E.D.N.Y 2002).
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b. Mendoza-Lopez and § 1326(d): Providing a Defense Against an
Indictment for Criminal Illegal Reentry
In United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, the Supreme Court held that a
deported alien indicted for criminal illegal reentry has a constitutional right
to defend against the indictment by collaterally attacking the validity of his
underlying deportation order.75  The Court reasoned that because
deportation is an element establishing a violation of a criminal offense,
"there must be some meaningful review" of the deportation proceeding,
where the alien alleges that defects in the proceeding "effectively
eliminate[d] the right of the alien to obtain judicial review."' 76 If the alien's
collateral attack demonstrates that the deportation proceeding violated his
right to judicial review, the indictment for criminal illegal reentry must be
dismissed.77
Congress responded to Mendoza-Lopez by codifying the elements of a
collateral attack and appending them to § 1326.78 The resulting subsection,
§ 1326(d), provides that an alien indicted for illegal reentry cannot
challenge the validity of his deportation order unless
(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been
available to seek relief against the order;
(2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued improperly
deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review; and
(3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.79
Congress listed these three elements in the conjunctive, and thus the alien
must prove all of them to mount a successful collateral attack. 80
With a background of deportation and illegal reentry established by Part
I.A, Part I.B focuses on how section 212(c) affected aliens such as Richard
Copeland.
B. Section 212(c): Its Purpose, Its Repeal, and Its Lingering Effect
Richard Copeland is among the aliens who defended against his
indictment for illegal reentry by collaterally attacking his original
deportation order.81 The particular basis for his attack was the failure of an
IJ to consider him for section 212(c) relief. To understand his arguments, it
is necessary to review the history and nature of section 212(c). Part I.B.1
describes the purpose of section 212(c) relief and how IJs and the BIA
75. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837-39 (1987).
76. Id. at 838-39.
77. Id. at 842.
78. CopelandII, 376 F.3d 61, 66 (2004).
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92, 99 (3d Cir. 2004).
81. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 171-95 and
accompanying text (describing the Second Circuit's decision in Copeland's case).
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determined whether to grant this relief. Part I.B.2 recounts the reasons why
Congress eliminated section 212(c) relief. Part I.B.3 specifies how section
212(c) relief continues to be an issue for courts presiding over indictments
for illegal reentry.
1. The Purpose of Section 212(c): Relief from Deportation
Part I.B. l.a summarizes how section 212(c) affected potentially
deportable aliens, and Part I.B. L.b describes how decision makers
determined whether an alien's case merited an exercise of section 212(c)
relief.
a. The Function and Application of Section 212(c)
Before its repeal, section 212(c) of the INA was very important to aliens
facing deportation proceedings. 82  Before the passage of the 1996
Amendments, section 212(c) afforded the Attorney General "broad
discretion" to waive deportation orders for aliens who committed
deportable offenses. 83 An alien could request this relief in immigration
court if she had maintained an "unrelinquished domicile of seven
consecutive years" in the United States and would prevail if she convinced
the IJ that her circumstances merited an exercise of discretion. 84  If,
however, the alien had committed one or more aggravated felonies and had
served a sentence of at least five years, she was ineligible for section 212(c)
relief.85 The alien carried the burden of proving her eligibility.8 6
82. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295 (2001) ("The extension of § 212(c) relief to
the deportation context has had great practical importance .... "); Nancy Morawetz, INS v.
St. Cyr: The Campaign to Preserve Court Review and Stop Retroactive Application of
Deportation Laws, in Immigration Stories 279, 281 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck
eds., 2005) ("[R]elief under section 212(c) ... served as the principle defense for LPRs who
faced deportation due to a criminal conviction.").
83. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 294-95; see also Rannik, supra note 44, at 124 (noting that
section 212(c) provided "the most common form of discretionary relief available to criminal
aliens" (footnote omitted)).
84. Codified at 8 U.S.C. 4 1182(c), section 212(c) provided as follows:
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded
abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to
a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in
the discretion of the Attorney General .... The first sentence of this subsection
shall not apply to an alien who has been convicted of one or more aggravated
felonies and has served for such felony or felonies a term of imprisonment of at
least 5 years.
INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996). Section 212(c) was literally
applicable to exclusion proceedings, but the BIA consistently interpreted it to allow any
deportable permanent resident alien to apply for relief so long as she had maintained an
unrelinquished domicile for seven consecutive years. Rannik, supra note 44, at 134.
85. See INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c); Trinh, supra note 54, at 553 ("[T]o be eligible
for the section 212(c) waiver, the LPR must not have committed a crime fitting the pre-1996
definition of an aggravated felony, nor have served more than five years in prison.").
86. Rannik, supra note 44, at 134.
2006] 2819
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
An alien who received a discretionary waiver of deportation remained in
the United States as a permanent resident.87 Consequently, prior to 1996,
many aliens charged with deportable offenses negotiated plea agreements
so that their sentences remained below five years and they became eligible
for section 212(c) relief.88 Under 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a), an IJ had a duty to
inform a deportable alien of her apparent eligibility for any relief provided
by statute-including section 212(c) relief-and to give her an opportunity
to apply for the relief during a deportation hearing. 89 From 1989 to 1995,
the BIA and IJs collectively "granted [section 212(c)] relief to more than
half of those who applied."90
b. How the BIA or an IJ Determined Whether to Grant Section 212(c)
Relief
In 1978, the BIA opinion Matter of Marin91 established a test governing
whether the BIA or an IJ was to grant section 212(c) relief. The opinion
instructed the decision maker to weigh "the adverse factors evidencing an
alien's undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane
considerations presented in his behalf."'92 Adverse factors included: the
nature and circumstances of the grounds for the alien's deportation; the
presence of additional immigration law violations; the existence of a
criminal record and its nature, recency, and seriousness; and the presence of
other evidence indicative of an alien's bad character or undesirability as a
permanent resident. 93  Favorable considerations included: family ties
within this country; residence of long duration in this country; arrival in the
country at a young age; evidence of hardship to the alien and to the alien's
family upon deportation; U.S. Armed Forces service; employment history;
community service; property or business ties; evidence attesting to good
character, such as affidavits; and, in the case of an alien convicted of
criminal conduct, proof of genuine rehabilitation.94 Applications for relief
were to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. 95  If the alien faced
deportation proceedings because he had two or more narcotics convictions,
87. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 295.
88. See, e.g., id. at 325-26.
89. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) (1997) (repealed 1998); see also Rannik, supra note 44, at
129 ("[M]ost criminal aliens who were deemed deportable were eligible to petition the
immigration judge for a waiver of deportation. Immigration judges were required to conduct
hearings for discretionary relief in a fundamentally fair manner and were not permitted to
refuse to consider discretionary relief where the alien was prima facie eligible for such relief
Thus, in addition to due process protections, criminal aliens in deportation proceedings were
also afforded an extra level of protection. Former Section 212(c) of the INA provided a
second chance to aliens with significant ties to the United States.").
90. Rannik, supra note 44, at 124 (citing 142 Cong. Rec. S12,294-01, S12,295 (daily ed.
Oct. 3, 1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham)).
91. 16 1. & N. Dec. 581 (B.I.A. 1978).
92. Id. at 584.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 584-85.
95. Rannik, supra note 44, at 136.
2820 [Vol. 74
GONE BUT NOT FORGOTTEN
or because he committed a violent crime, he might be required to
demonstrate "unusual or outstanding countervailing equities to obtain a
waiver of deportation." 96
2. The Repeal of Section 212(c): The Enactment of AEDPA and IIRIRA
The 1990s witnessed a growing societal resentment toward aliens in the
United States.97 The animosity spiked after the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing and the 1996 Oklahoma City bombing. 98 Congress reacted to
public pressure by passing AEDPA 99 and IIRIRA. 100 AEDPA was enacted
on April 24, 1996,101 and IIRIRA was enacted on September 30, 1996.102
The 1996 Amendments dramatically affected the availability of section
212(c) relief. For example, AEDPA included a new, broad list of offenses
that precluded section 212(c) relief.10 3 Congress intended AEDPA to
simplify the prosecution of accused terrorists and to facilitate the
deportation of noncitizen criminals, 10 4 but several government officials
quickly realized that AEDPA generated "problems with enforcement and
efficiency in deportation proceedings."'1 5 Even President Bill Clinton
96. See CopelandIl, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275, 289-90 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
97. See, e.g., Tallman, supra note 30, at 886-87 (describing a wave of "anti-immigrant
sentiment" which resulted in Proposition 187 and other exclusionary legislation).
98. See Trinh, supra note 54, at 548 ("There has long been a negative sentiment toward
immigrants based on the belief that they are responsible for social problems .... Often,
these beliefs are shown to be unfounded, but the animosity towards immigrants remains.
The resentment escalated when it was revealed that illegal aliens were responsible for the
bombing of the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, which killed six people and
injured more than 1000 others. After the bombing of Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995,
anti-immigration sentiment reached a new peak though it was later revealed that two U.S.
citizens were responsible for the attack." (footnotes omitted)).
99. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in various sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
100. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in various sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
For a description of Congress's behavior during this time, see Trinh, supra note 54, at 548.
101. 110 Stat. 1214.
102. 110 Stat. 3009-546.
103. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295 n.4, 297 (2001). Section 440(d) of AEDPA
also precluded relief for any LPR convicted of an aggravated felony or convicted of two or
more crimes of moral turpitude. See Trinh, supra note 54, at 553 ("Under section 440(d) of
the AEDPA, it was impossible for LPRs convicted of any crimes classified as 'aggravated
felonies' to petition for a section 212(c) waiver regardless of the sentence imposed or time
served."); see also Rannik, supra note 44, at 129 ("AEDPA enhanced the ability of
immigration officers to deport criminal aliens by eliminating judicial review for aliens
deemed deportable for committing aggravated felonies. AEDPA also went a step further and
recategorized most crimes involving moral turpitude as aggravated felonies, thereby
eliminating Section 212(c) relief for all but the most minor criminal offenses." (footnote
omitted)).
104. Trinh, supra note 54, at 548.
105. Id. at 549-50 (noting several criticisms of AEDPA); see also Rannik, supra note 44,
at 124-25 ("Following the enactment of AEDPA, members of Congress recognized that
'there might be certain rare circumstances we had not contemplated, when the removal of a
particular alien might not be appropriate."' (quoting 142 Cong. Rec. S12,294-01, S12,294
(daily ed. Oct. 3, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch))).
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acknowledged that AEDPA made "major, ill-advised changes in our
immigration laws having nothing to do with fighting terrorism."'10 6
To address the problems remaining after the passage of AEDPA,
Congress enacted IIRIRA only a few months later. 10 7 IIRIRA completely
repealed section 212(c) relief.10 8 The amendment created a new form of
discretionary relief for LPRs under section 240A(a) of the INA called
"Cancellation of Removal," 10 9 but this relief was available for a very
narrow class of aliens: "Congress explicitly stated that [section 240A(a)]
relief is intended only for 'highly unusual cases involving outstanding
aliens."' l 0  IIRIRA, along with AEDPA, created more than fifty new
deportable offenses. 11
3. The Lingering Effect of Section 212(c): Confusion About the
Application of AEDPA and IIRIRA
AEDPA and IIRIRA placed different restrictions on section 212(c) relief,
and as each amendment became effective, a complicated question arose: If
an alien was convicted of a deportable crime and was eligible for section
212(c) relief before the amendment went into effect, yet the alien's
deportation proceeding began or the case came before an IJ after the
amendment went into effect, was the alien still eligible for section 212(c)
relief? That is, did the provisions of AEDPA or IIRIRA retroactively
eliminate an alien's eligibility for section 212(c) relief? The BIA
interpreted the 1996 Amendments as having this effect, 112 but in 2001, the
106. Trinh, supra note 54, at 549-50.
107. 110 Stat. 3009-546; Trinh, supra note 54, at 549 ("Shortly after AEDPA was passed,
Congress launched an effort to address problems with enforcement and efficiency in
deportation proceedings. Consequently, IIRIRA was enacted on September 30, 1996."
(footnote omitted)).
108. See 110 Stat. 3009-597.
109. 1NA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2000).
110. Rannik, supra note 44, at 139 (quoting 142 Cong. Rec. H10,841-02, H10,896 (daily
ed. Sept. 24, 1996) (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference)). An
LPR is eligible for consideration of relief under section 240A(a) if she
(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less
than 5 years,
(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been
admitted in any status, and
(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.
INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
11. Trinh, supra note 54, at 552.
112. Copeland H, 376 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 2004). On February 21, 1997, the Attorney
General issued an order interpreting AEDPA as applying retroactively. See Daniel P.
Derechin, AEDPA Amends Section 212(c): Alien Who Is Deportable Under Sections
241(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i) of the INA Is Ineligible for a Waiver of Inadmissibility Under
Section 212(c) of the Act When the Waiver Is Requested Alone or in Conjunction with an
Application for Adjustment of Status, 11 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 922, 922-23 (1997).
Consequently, the BIA interpreted the 1996 Amendments as stripping eligibility for section
212(c) relief from any LPR who had pled guilty to an aggravated felony, regardless of when
the LPR entered his plea. See Copelandl, 376 F.3d at 64. Several federal courts, however,
disagreed with the BIA's interpretation and held that the 1996 Amendments did not have a
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Supreme Court disagreed. In INS v. St. Cyr,113 the Court held that "§
212(c) relief remains available for aliens.., whose convictions were
obtained through plea agreements and who.. . would have been eligible for
§ 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect."''1 4 In
other words, notwithstanding the effective dates of AEDPA or IIRIRA,
each amendment's restrictions on section 212(c) relief do not affect an
alien's eligibility for that relief so long as (1) the alien pled guilty to a
deportable crime and (2) the alien was eligible for section 212(c) relief at
the time of his plea. 115
Unlike Richard Copeland, the noncitizen in St. Cyr had not been
deported; he was only ordered deported. However, St. Cyr's deportation
proceedings were quite similar to Copeland's. St. Cyr had been an LPR in
the United States. 116 On March 8, 1996-before the passage of the 1996
Amendments-St. Cyr pled guilty to the aggravated felony of selling a
controlled substance. 117 The INS initiated deportation proceedings against
him on April 10, 1997-after the passage of the 1996 Amendments. 118 An
IJ denied St. Cyr's application for section 212(c) relief, and the BIA
affirmed the IJ's decision, reasoning that IIRIRA had eliminated his
eligibility for relief.119 Unlike Copeland, St. Cyr subsequently filed a
habeas petition, arguing that the BIA improperly failed to consider him for
section 212(c) relief.120 The district court accepted St. Cyr's argument, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 121
The Court determined that the 1996 Amendments did not eliminate St.
Cyr's eligibility for section 212(c) relief based on two analyses. The first
retroactive effect. Id. at 65 (citing, as examples of opinions that rejected the Attorney
General's interpretation, Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 133 (1st Cir. 1998), and Mojica
v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)). For further details about this debate
immediately after the passage of AEDPA, see Morawetz, supra note 82, at 283-87.
113. 533 U.S. 289(2001).
114. Id. at 326. Before reaching this decision, the Court held that the 1996 Amendments
did not eliminate the Court's jurisdiction to hear the claims asserted by St. Cyr's habeas
petition. See generally id at 298-314.
115. Although the Court's holding meant that AEDPA did not retroactively eliminate
section 212(c) relief for aggravated felons, the Court did not address whether AEDPA's new
lists of aggravated felonies could be applied retroactively to make aliens who committed
those crimes before AEDPA deportable. So far, AEDPA has indeed had this effect. See
Tracey Topper Gonzalez, Individual Rights Versus Collective Security: Assessing the
Constitutionality of the USA Patriot Act, U. Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev., Fall 2003, at 75,
92 ("AEDPA provides for retroactive and prospective deportation of aliens convicted of
certain listed 'aggravated felonies'...."); Trinh, supra note 54, at 545 ("[The 1996
Amendments] apply retroactively to punish LPRs for past crimes. Since the implementation
of AEDPA and IIRIRA, many LPRs with criminal records find themselves facing
deportation regardless of the severity of their crimes or how well they have rehabilitated.").
116. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 2000), aff'd, St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289.
120. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293.
121. Id.
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analysis was a statutory interpretation of IIRIRA. The Court acknowledged
that "Congress has the power to enact laws with retrospective effect," but
the Court also noted that a statute can have a retrospective effect only where
Congress clearly intended it.122 The Court then found that the language of
IIRIRA was arabiguous about retroactively eliminating section 212(c)
relief,123 leading the Court to conclude that such retroactive elimination
would be "impermissible" when applied to defendants like St. Cyr, who
entered into plea agreements in the hopes of obtaining relief from
deportation. 124
The second basis for the Court's holding was a fairness analysis. The
Court frequently cited a statistic that from 1989 to 1995, 51.5% of section
212(c) waivers were granted. 125 This statistic indicated to the Court that
"the class of aliens whose continued residence in this country has depended
on their eligibility for § 212(c) relief is extremely large, and not
surprisingly, a substantial percentage of their applications for § 212(c) relief
have been granted."'126 The heavy reliance of aliens like St. Cyr on the
availability of section 212(c) relief when entering their pleas was especially
persuasive to the Court that retroactive application of the 1996
Amendments was unfair:
Now that prosecutors have received the benefit of these plea agreements,
agreements that were likely facilitated by the aliens' belief in their
continued eligibility for § 212(c) relief, it would surely be contrary to
"familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled
expectations[]"... to hold that IIRIRA's subsequent restrictions deprive
them of any possibility of such relief.127
Finally, the Court noted that the discretionary nature of section 212(c) relief
"does not affect the propriety of [the Court's] conclusion" because "[t]here
is a clear difference, for the purposes of retroactivity analysis, between
facing possible deportation and facing certain deportation."' 128 For all of
these reasons, St. Cyr held that aliens who pled guilty to crimes before the
effective dates of the 1996 Amendments in order to remain eligible for
section 212(c) relief could still be considered for that relief. 129 After the
122. Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 318-20.
124. Id. at 320.
125. See id. at 296 & n.5 (pointing out that "in the period between 1989 and 1995 alone, §
212(c) relief was granted to over 10,000 aliens"); id. at 323 (noting "the frequency with
which § 212(c) relief was granted in the years leading up to AEDPA and IIRIRA"); id. at
325 ("Prior to AEDPA and IIRIRA, aliens like St. Cyr had a significant likelihood of
receiving § 212(c) relief.").
126. Id. at 295-96; see supra note 125.
127. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323-24 (citation omitted).
128. Id. at 325.
129. Id. at 326.
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Court's decision, St. Cyr had a hearing before an IJ and received section
212(c) relief. 130
The Supreme Court's decision in St. Cyr had a large impact on the
defense strategies of many aliens indicted for criminal illegal reentry.
Aliens like Richard Copeland could now argue that their deportation orders
were defective because the BIA or an IJ applied the 1996 Amendments
retroactively before St. Cyr and failed to consider the aliens for section
212(c) relief. 131 Courts thus had to decide whether to vacate an alien's
indictment for illegal reentry because the failure of the BIA or an IJ to
consider the alien for section 212(c) relief rendered the deportation order
fundamentally unfair within the meaning of § 1326(d)(3). 132 As Part II of
this Note discusses, the circuit courts split over the resolution of this issue.
II. How COURTS CONTINUE TO GRAPPLE WITH SECTION 212(c) RELIEF
As of October 2005, several circuits have questioned whether a failure of
the BIA or an IJ to consider a potentially eligible alien for section 212(c)
relief renders a deportation proceeding fundamentally unfair under §
1326(d)(3). As Part II.A describes, the majority of the circuits that have
considered the question have held that such a failure does not render a
deportation proceeding fundamentally unfair. The Second and Ninth
Circuits are the only jurisdictions to disagree, both holding that a
deportation proceeding can be fundamentally unfair so long as the alien
proves that he was prejudiced by the BIA's or IJ's failure to consider him
for relief. Parts II.B and II.C outline the reasonings of the Second and
Ninth Circuits, respectively. These parts also detail, however, how the
Second and Ninth Circuits disagree about the appropriate prejudice
standard. The Second Circuit holds that the alien must show a "reasonable
probability" of relief at his deportation to demonstrate prejudice; the Ninth
Circuit holds that the alien must only show a "plausible ground" for relief.
Part II.D describes how district courts have responded to the Second and
Ninth Circuits' prejudice standards.
A. Interpretation One: A Failure to Consider an Alien for Section 212(c)
Relief Is Not Fundamentally Unfair
All of the decisions holding that a failure to consider a potentially
eligible alien for section 212(c) relief is not fundamentally unfair involve an
alien with the same basic immigration history as Richard Copeland. The
alien in each case pled guilty to a crime prior to the passage of the 1996
130. Morawetz, supra note 82, at 306. Morawetz also notes that "[b]y 2001, when the
Supreme Court issued its decision in St. Cyr[,] ... thousands had been deported and would
not reap the benefit of the decision." Id. at 280.
131. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 171-95 and
accompanying text (describing the Second Circuit's decision in Copeland's case).
132. The question assumes that the alien can meet the requirements of § 1326(d)(1) and
(2).
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Amendments with the belief that doing so preserved the possibility of
applying for section 212(c) relief; the alien was found deportable at
proceedings that took place after the effective dates of the 1996
Amendments but before St. Cyr; the BIA or an IJ incorrectly failed to
consider the alien for section 212(c) relief; the alien was deported; and after
his deportation, the alien reentered the United States, was indicted for the
crime of illegal reentry, and attempted to collaterally attack his deportation
order based on the BIA's or IJ's failure to consider him for relief.133 The
cases described below delineate the various reasons why courts have
rejected such a collateral attack, holding that a failure to consider an alien
for section 212(c) relief is not fundamentally unfair.
1. United States v. Wilson
In United States v. Wilson, 134 the Fourth Circuit held that to establish
"fundamental unfairness" under § 1326(d)(3), an alien had to show that "(1)
his due process rights were violated by defects in his underlying deportation
proceeding, and (2) he suffered prejudice as a result of the defects."' 135 The
Fourth Circuit then relied on one of its previous cases, Smith v. Ashcrofi, 136
to hold that the alien in question could not prove fundamental unfairness
because there was no due process right to section 212(c) relief. 137 In Smith,
the court had held that "to advance a due process claim, [the defendant must
have] a property or liberty interest at stake."' 138 For a statute to create such
a liberty or property interest, the statute must satisfy two elements: First, it
must "direct" that the individual possesses "entitlement to the benefit;" and
second, the statute must limit meaningfully the discretion of decision
makers. 139 Regarding the establishment of entitlement to a benefit, the
133. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Wilson, 316 F.3d 506 (4th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2002). For a discussion of a
Seventh Circuit case seeming to agree with these decisions in dicta, see Wible, supra note
70, at 471-72 (summarizing United States v. Roque-Espinoza, 338 F.3d 724, 729 (7th Cir.
2003)).
134. 316 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003).
135. Id. at 510 (citing United States v. Zarate-Martinez, 133 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir.
1998); United States v. Encarnacion-Galvez, 964 F.2d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1992)). As of
1999, all circuit courts held that a successful collateral attack requires a showing of
prejudice. Stephen Yale-Loehr & Rachel J. Valente, Current Trends in Illegal Reentry
Cases, 3 T.M. Cooley J. Prac. & Clinical L. 1, 7 (1999).
136. 295 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2002). Wilson was not governed by Smith because in Smith,
the defendant-alien did not collaterally attack his deportation order on the basis of the I's
failure to consider him for section 212(c) relief. Rather, the alien claimed that his due
process rights were violated "because he was not given court review of the BIA ruling that
he was not entitled to discretionary relief." Id. at 428.
137. Wilson, 316 F.3d at 510. The court also found that even assuming Wilson could
prove a due process violation, he could not prove prejudice. Id. at 511.
138. Smith, 295 F.3d at 429 (citing Stewart v. Bailey, 7 F.3d 384, 392 (4th Cir. 1993);
Jamil v. Sec'y, Dep't of Def., 910 F.2d 1203, 1209 (4th Cir. 1990)).
139. Id. at 429-30 (quoting Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 382 (1987) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting)).
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Smith court insisted that even where a state has frequently granted statutory,
discretionary relief, this tendency does not create a right protected by the
Due Process Clause. 140  The statute "must confer more than a mere
expectation (even one supported by consistent government practice) of a
benefit" to create a protected due process right.' 4 ' The Smith court then
reasoned that the discretionary nature of section 212(c) relief kept section
212(c) from reaching this standard.142 Regarding meaningful limitations on
the decision maker's discretion, the court cited St. Cyr's observation that
the "Attorney General [had] broad discretion to admit excludable aliens" 143
to argue that section 212(c) relief did not limit the discretion of decision
makers. 144  Thus finding that section 212(c) did not meet the two
requirements to establish a liberty or property interest, the Smith court held
that consideration for section 212(c) relief was not a due process right.145
Based on this decision, the Wilson court concluded that a failure to consider
an alien for relief did not render a deportation proceeding "fundamentally
unfair" under § 1326(d)(3).146
2. United States v. Lopez-Ortiz
The Fifth Circuit rejected an alien's collateral attack for similar reasons
in United States v. Lopez-Ortiz.147 The court asserted that St. Cyr was "not
grounded in § 212(c) relief having the status of a constitutionally protected
interest; rather, [St. Cyr] was based on the Court's interpretation of
IIRIRA."' 148 The court also argued that "[a]s a piece of legislative grace,
[section 212(c)] conveyed no rights, it conferred no status, and its denial
does not implicate the Due Process clause."'149 Ultimately, like the Fourth
Circuit's Wilson decision, Lopez-Ortiz held that section 212(c) does not
establish a liberty or property interest, and thus the failure of the BIA or an
IJ to consider an alien for section 212(c) relief cannot be a due process
violation amounting to fundamental unfairness. '50
3. United States v. Torres
In United States v. Torres,l'1 the Third Circuit shared the Fourth and
Fifth Circuit's view that "discretionary relief is necessarily a matter of grace
140. Id. at 430.
141. Id. at 429.
142. Id. at 429-30.
143. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 294-95 (2001).
144. Smith, 295 F.3d at 430.
145. Id. at431.
146. United States v. Wilson, 316 F.3d 506, 510 (4th Cir. 2003).
147. 313 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2002).
148. Id. at 231.
149. Id. (quoting Alfarache v. Cravener, 203 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations
omitted)).
150. Id.
151. 383 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 2004).
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rather than of right."' 152 However, the court acknowledged that there was
"superficial support" for the notion that an alien retained a due process
interest in being considered for section 212(c) relief.153 The court noted
that there is a difference between the right to be considered for discretionary
relief and the right to a favorable exercise of that relief.' 54  Citing
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 155 the
court observed that a prisoner may have a due process right to consideration
of parole, even though a prisoner has no right to the favorable exercise of
that relief.156 In Greenholtz, the Supreme Court held that the "mere hope"
of parole is not protected by due process.' 57 "Where, however, a state
creates a parole system that statutorily mandates release unless specified
conditions are met, a prisoner eligible for parole consideration may be
entitled to certain due process protections."'158 Thus, the Torres court
conceded that discretionary relief can amount to a due process right under
certain circumstances.
To distinguish the immigration case before it from Greenholtz, however,
the Torres court argued that section 212(c) uses no "'explicit mandatory
language"' to create a due process right in consideration for section 212(c)
relief and that thus the statute offers a "'mere hope' . . . of relief."'1 59 The
court also found that section 212(c) does not create a presumption in favor
of relief 160 and that the possibility of relief was "speculative at best."' 161
Based on these interpretations, the court concluded that a failure during a
deportation proceeding to consider an alien for section 212(c) relief could
not be fundamentally unfair. 162
4. United States v. Aguirre-Tello
In United States v. Aguirre-Tello,163 the Tenth Circuit issued an en banc
opinion similarly rejecting an alien's argument that a failure to consider him
for section 212(c) relief was fundamentally unfair.164 While the courts in
152. Id. at 104.
153. Id. at 105.
154. Id.
155. 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
156. Torres, 383 F.3d at 105.
157. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11.
158. Torres, 383 F.3d at 105 (citing, along with some circuit court cases, Greenholtz, 442
U.S. at 12); see Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12 ("We can accept respondents' view that the
expectancy of release provided in this statute is entitled to some measure of constitutional
protection. However, we emphasize that this statute has unique structure and language and
thus whether any other state statute provides a protectible entitlement must be decided on a
case-by-case basis.").
159. Torres, 383 F.3d at 105.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 104.
162. Id. at 106.
163. 353 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004).
164. The en banc opinion reversed a panel decision, United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 324
F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003), rev'd, Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199.
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Wilson, Lopez-Ortiz, and Torres based their decisions on a narrow
interpretation of section 212(c) relief, the Tenth Circuit relied on a limited
interpretation of deportation due process rights in general. The court began
by recognizing that deportations are civil procedures not associated with the
same constitutional protections as criminal proceedings. 165 The court then
asserted that beyond this principle, "[tihe Supreme Court has not...
defined what fundamental fairness requires in a civil deportation proceeding
context, but [the Court] has suggested that [fundamental fairness] prohibits
'procedural errors... so fundamental that they may functionally deprive
the alien of judicial review."'' 166 The Tenth Circuit cited its own opinions
defining due process for deportable aliens as "'an opportunity to be heard at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."' 1 67 This narrow view of
due process for deportations led the court to conclude that a failure to
consider an alien for section 212(c) relief does not amount to a
constitutional violation. 168  Moreover, the Tenth Circuit questioned the
predictive value of the statistic-relied on by the Supreme Court in St.
Cyr-that 51.5% of relief applications were granted:
[The statistic] does not show.., what proportion of those successful
waiver applicants were convicted of serious violent felonies comparable
to Aguirre-Tello's conviction for attempted murder. Without any
indication that any of those successful applicants were similarly situated
to Aguirre-Tello, the conclusion that he had at least a 50% chance of
receiving a discretionary waiver is pure speculation, if not actually
misleading. 169
In the Tenth Circuit's view, the Supreme Court's mistake of relying on the
statistic bolstered the Tenth Circuit's holding that a failure to consider a
potentially eligible alien for section 212(c) relief is not fundamentally
unfair. 170
B. Interpretation Two: A Failure to Consider an Alien for Section 212(c)
Relief Can Be Fundamentally Unfair, So Long as the Alien Demonstrates
that There Was a Reasonable Probability of Relief
Richard Copeland's case was the occasion on which the Second Circuit
became one of two circuits to hold that a failure to consider a potentially
eligible alien for section 212(c) relief can be fundamentally unfair. As
discussed in the Introduction, Copeland was deportable for criminal
offenses, was told by an IJ that there was no relief available to him, and was
165. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d at 1204.
166. Id. (quoting United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 839 n.17 (1987)).
167. Id. at 1204-05 (quoting Aguilera v. Kirkpatrick, 241 F.3d 1286, 1292 (10th Cir.
2001)).
168. Id. at 1205. The court also established "reasonable likelihood" as the standard for
prejudice and applied the facts to this standard in dicta. Id. at 1209-10.
169. Id. at 1210.
170. See id.
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ordered deported. 17 1 Copeland did not appeal the IJ's decision to the BIA
within the mandated thirty-day limit,172 but in September 1998, Copeland
filed a motion to reopen his deportation proceeding, alleging that the IJ
"breached his obligation under 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) to inform Copeland of
his eligibility for Section 212(c) relief.' 173 The same IJ denied Copeland's
motion, and although Copeland appealed this decision to the BIA, Copeland
was deported before the BIA considered his appeal. 174 After Copeland
reentered the country, he was arrested and indicted for the crime of illegal
reentry. 175 A federal district court dismissed the indictment based on the
IJ's failure to inform Copeland of his eligibility for section 212(c) relief,
and on appeal, the Second Circuit agreed. 176 In United States v. Copeland
(Copeland J]),177 the Second Circuit reached two conclusions: First, a
"failure to advise a potential deportee of a right to seek Section 212(c) relief
can, if prejudicial, be fundamentally unfair within the meaning of Section
1326(d)(3);"' 178 and second, to prove prejudice, the alien must demonstrate
that he had a "reasonable probability" of receiving relief.179
In deciding the first point-that a failure to consider an alien for section
212(c) relief can be fundamentally unfair-the court noted that an alien can
only demonstrate fundamental unfairness by showing a fundamental
procedural error. 180 The court then challenged the decisions holding that an
IJ's failure to consider an alien for section 212(c) relief is not a fundamental
error. First, the Second Circuit focused on the language of § 1326(d)(3),
pointing out that "fundamental unfairness" becomes very apparent in cases
where an alien with a high chance of relief was not considered for it:
To be sure, relief under Section 212(c) is not constitutionally mandated
and is discretionary. It does not follow, however, that where an alien is
erroneously denied information regarding the right to seek such relief, and
the erroneous denial of that information results in a deportation that likely
would have been avoided if the alien was properly informed, such error is
not fundamentally unfair within the meaning of Section 1326(d)(3).' 8'
The unfairness of such cases, the court reasoned, is especially striking
because IJs owe special duties to aliens to develop the records of their
deportations and to inform them of any available relief.182 Second, the
171. Copeland I, 376 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 2004).
172. Id
173. Id. at 65.
174. Id. The BIA then dismissed Copeland's appeal as moot under 8 C.F.R. § 3.6(b)
because Copeland had already been deported. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 66.
177. Id. at 61.
178. Id. at 71.
179. Id. at 73.
180. Id. at 70 (citing United States v. Femandez-Antonia, 278 F.3d 150, 159 (2d Cir.
2002)).
181. Id. at 71.
182. Id. ("[A] ruling by an IJ that misleads an alien into believing that no relief exists falls
into a different category because of the special duties of an IJ to aliens.").
2830 [Vol. 74
GONE BUT NOT FORGOTTEN
court criticized the decisions not finding fundamental unfairness for
collapsing the distinction between a right to seek relief and a right to the
relief itself: Such decisions "incorrectly assume that, because the grant of
Section 212(c) relief is itself discretionary, the denial of a Section 212(c)
hearing cannot be a fundamental procedural error."18 3 The court embraced
St. Cyr's finding that section 212(c) relief was granted in a "'substantial
percentage"' of cases, 184 and the court read St. Cyr as denying that the right
to seek discretionary relief can be revoked. 185 Thus, the court concluded
that the "denial of an established right to be informed of the possibility of
[section 212(c)] relief can, if prejudicial, be a fundamental procedural
error."
186
After determining that Copeland could collaterally attack his deportation
order, the court addressed Copeland's burden to demonstrate prejudice.
Borrowing the prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims
from Strickland v. Washington,187 the court held that "prejudice is shown
where there is a reasonable probability that, but for the IJ's unprofessional
errors, the alien would have been granted Section 212(c) relief."' 188 The
Second Circuit reasoned that the Strickland standard "is close-fitting
because the denial of an opportunity to apply for Section 212(c) relief will
generally be the result either of a lawyer having caused an eligible alien to
fail to apply .. .or of an IJ, owing special duties to a pro se alien, having
failed to give notice of such an opportunity.' ' 189
The Second Circuit explained that its "reasonable probability" standard
makes the determination of prejudice "akin to a trial within a trial."' 190 The
adjudicating court must gather all the facts relevant to the determination of
relief for the alien, balance the factors stated in Matter of Marin,191 and take
into account similar cases. 192  The court further instructed that
"' [w]here... an alien is deportable by reason of two narcotics convictions,
the alien must make a showing of unusual or outstanding countervailing
equities to obtain a waiver of deportation."" 193 The court instructed that
183. Id. at 72.
184. Id. at 73 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296 (2001)).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 72.
187. 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (noting that prejudice is shown where "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different").
188. CopelandIl, 376 F.3d at 73.
189. Id. (citation omitted).
190. Id.
191. See supra Part I.B. .b (describing the Marin factors).
192. Copeland]], 376 F.3d at 74.
193. ld. (quoting Lovell v. INS, 52 F.3d 458, 461 (2d Cir. 1995)). In United States v.
Scott, 394 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2005), the Second Circuit also suggested that a "lengthy
criminal history" might require a defendant-alien to show "unusual or outstanding equities"
in his favor. Id. at 120-21 (quoting Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 875 (B.I.A. 1994)).
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Copeland's criminal record at the time of his deportation was relevant. 194
Because the court felt that the record did not contain enough information
about any factors in Copeland's favor, the court remanded the case to the
district court to determine "whether Copeland was prejudiced by the IJ's
failure to advise him of his right to seek Section 212(c) relief."' 195
C. Interpretation Three: A Failure to Consider an Alien for Section 212(c)
Relief Can Be Fundamentally Unfair, So Long as the Alien Demonstrates
that There Was a Plausible Ground for Relief
The Ninth Circuit is the only other circuit besides the Second to hold that
a failure to consider an alien for section 212(c) relief can constitute
fundamental unfairness. Several Ninth Circuit cases have addressed this
issue. For example, in United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa,196 as in other
Ninth Circuit cases, the court's holding had two points: First, a failure by
the BIA or an IJ to consider a potentially qualified alien for section 212(c)
relief is, if prejudicial, fundamentally unfair; and second, to demonstrate
prejudice, an alien must show that he had a "plausible ground" for obtaining
section 212(c) relief at the time of his deportation proceeding. 197
The alien in Ubaldo-Figueroa was deported after pleading guilty on
separate occasions to one count of attempted first degree burglary of a
dwelling, three counts of disorderly conduct, and driving under the
influence. 198  During Ubaldo-Figueroa's deportation proceeding, an IJ
failed to advise him of his eligibility for section 212(c) relief. 199 After
being deported, Ubaldo-Figueroa reentered the United States and was
indicted for criminal illegal reentry under § 1326.200 The Ninth Circuit
vacated his indictment, reasoning that his deportation proceeding could be
fundamentally unfair because section 212(c) relief was "at least one
plausible legal challenge to his removal order."' 20 1  Ubaldo-Figueroa's
burden required that he demonstrate prejudice from the IJ's failure to
consider him for relief, and thus Ubaldo-Figueroa had to show that he had a
"plausible ground" for relief at the time of his deportation. 20 2 The court
194. Copeland 11, 376 F.3d at 74; see also Scott, 394 F.3d at 119 (emphasizing this
instruction and instructing that courts cannot consider any positive or negative factors
occurring after the time of the deportation).
195. Copeland I, 376 F.3d at 74-75. For a discussion of other recent Second Circuit
decisions relevant to criminal illegal reentry cases, see Wible, supra note 70, at 475.
196. 364 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2004).
197. Id. at 1050. For cases with similar holdings, see United States v. Gonzalez-Valerio,
342 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Leon-Leon, 35 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("An alien's due process rights are adequately protected if... he can establish in
a later criminal case that the defects in the deportation hearing actually prejudiced him.").
198. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1046 & n.5.
199. Id. at 1048.
200. Id. at 1047.
201. Id. at 1050.
202. Id; cf Gonzalez- Valerio, 342 F.3d at 1054 ("Once [the alien] makes a prima facie
showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the procedural
violation could not have changed the proceedings' outcome."); United States v. Higareda-
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found that he satisfied this burden, but the court did not do so by explicitly
balancing the factors listed in Matter of Marin.20 3 Rather, the court held
that Ubaldo-Figueroa had a plausible ground for relief because of the
"significant" equities in his favor: gainful employment since he came to the
United States; "substantial family ties in the United States, including a
United States citizen wife and two United States citizen children"; and an
active role in his children's education and upbringing. 204 Considering these
favorable factors, and not juxtaposing them to any negative factors, the
court concluded that Ubaldo-Figueroa had been prejudiced by the I's
failure to advise him of eligibility for section 212(c) relief.20 5
The Ninth Circuit's "plausible ground" standard is more generous than
the "reasonable probability" standard of the Second Circuit.20 6 The Ninth
Circuit's prejudice standard, however, has not allowed every illegal reentry
defendant to argue successfully that his deportation proceeding was
fundamentally unfair. Two circumstances in particular have prevented
some aliens from demonstrating a plausible ground for relief. The first
circumstance has occurred where the alien committed a deportable offense
after the 1996 Amendments took effect. For example, the defendant in
Ramirez, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1253 n.7 (D. Haw. 2000) ("The 'prejudice' requirement
imposed in ... cases involving direct judicial review of decisions of the Board of
Immigration Appeals is identical to the 'prejudice' requirement imposed on a defendant who
collaterally attacks a deportation order in a subsequent criminal prosecution for unauthorized
re-entry after deportation." (citing United States v. Jimenez-Marmolejo, 104 F.3d 1083, 1086
(9th Cir. 1996))).
203. See Marin, 16 1. & N. Dec. 581, 584 (B.I.A. 1978).
204. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1050-51.
205. Id at 1051. Unlike the Second Circuit's opinion in Copeland I, Ubaldo-Figueroa
and other recent Ninth Circuit opinions do not explain in detail the basis for the Ninth
Circuit's prejudice standard. See, e.g., United States v. Interian-Mata, 118 F. App'x 223 (9th
Cir. 2004); United States v. Gonzalez-Valerio, 342 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). One possible
explanation for this is that the Ninth Circuit developed its prejudice standard over two
decades ago. Several years before the Supreme Court's decision in Mendoza-Lopez, the
Ninth Circuit held that an alien indicted for illegal reentry could collaterally attack his
underlying deportation. See, e.g., United States v. Barraza-Leon, 575 F.2d 218 (9th Cir.
1978). In United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit
responded to an alien's collateral attack by holding that a "[v]iolation of a[n immigration]
regulation does not invalidate a deportation proceeding unless the regulation serves a
purpose of benefit to the alien." Id. at 531. The court concluded by remanding the case to
the district court and instructing that
[o]n remand the aliens should be allowed the opportunity to demonstrate
prejudice resulting from the INS regulation violations. The district courts will
determine whether [a] violation... harmed the aliens' interests in such a way as to
affect potentially the outcome of their deportation proceedings. Any such harm
should be identified specifically. If either alien shows such prejudice, the
indictment against him may be dismissed.
Id. at 532. The language in Calderon-Medina, warning against violations that could "affect
potentially the outcome of... deportation proceedings," id, might have planted the seed that
eventually produced the "plausible ground" standard.
206. For an argument that the Ninth Circuit's prejudice standard can be interpreted "as
granting defendants in illegal reentry cases the benefit of the doubt, even if they have a
borderline claim of prejudice, as long as they establish that their deportation proceeding was
procedurally deficient," see Wible, supra note 70, at 475.
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United States v. Gonzalez- Valerio20 7 had been convicted prior to the
enactment of the 1996 Amendments of committing a lewd act upon a
child. 20 8 This crime alone did not bar him from consideration for section
212(c) relief, but after the 1996 Amendments took effect, he was convicted
of battering his spouse.20 9 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that when
Gonzalez-Valerio faced deportation proceedings after these two convictions
and the IJ failed to consider him for section 212(c) relief, Gonzalez-Valerio
was not prejudiced "because his 1997 conviction for [battering his] spouse
statutorily barred him from receiving § 212(c) relief. ' 210 As the court
explained, "If [Gonzalez-Valerio] is barred from receiving relief, his claim
is not 'plausible.'211
The second circumstance preventing an alien from demonstrating a
plausible ground for relief has occurred where the alien has a serious
criminal history. The BIA has required that such aliens demonstrate
"unusual or outstanding equities in order to receive relief. '212 Serious
criminal histories usually involve convictions for multiple crimes. For
example, individual aliens have faced the "unusual or outstanding equities"
doctrine due to convictions for lewd acts on a child, spousal abuse, and
resisting arrest;213 convictions for several drug transactions; 214 convictions
for DUIs, petty theft, second degree burglary, and corporal injury on a
spouse;215 and convictions for one drug offense and multiple driving
infractions.216 If an alien with a serious criminal history cannot show
207. 342 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003).
208. Id. at 1052.
209. Id. at 1053.
210. Id. at 1054.
211. Id at 1056. For other decisions in which the Ninth Circuit did not find prejudice on
similar grounds, see United States v. Garcia-Martinez, 228 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2000)
("[The defendant] must demonstrate actual prejudice."); United States v. Leon-Leon, 35 F.3d
1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Leon-Leon argues prejudice should be presumed....
[Nevertheless,] Leon-Leon failed to refute the fact that he is clearly deportable.").
212. Gonzalez-Valerio, 342 F.3d at 1056-57 (quoting Edwards, 20 I. & N. Dec. 191
(B.I.A. 1990)).
213. Id. ("Gonzalez's claim of prejudice is further undermined by the requirement that an
applicant for § 212(c) relief who has a serious criminal history must demonstrate unusual or
outstanding equities in order to receive relief.").
214. Gutierrez-Chavez v. INS, 298 F.3d 824, 825-27, 830 (9th Cir. 2002) (approving of
the district court's finding that the defendant failed to "make a showing of unusual or
outstanding equities" because of the seriousness of his offense, which involved participating
in ten drug transactions over six months).
215. United States v. Hernandez-Sanchez, 137 F. App'x 943, 944 (9th Cir. 2005)
(unpublished opinion).
216. Ayala-Chavez v. INS, 944 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The outstanding equities
standard is rationally related to the statutory scheme .... [T]he immigration laws clearly
reflect strong Congressional policy against lenient treatment of drug offenders." (citations
and internal quotation omitted)). For a district court arguing that a conviction for forcible
rape warrants the heightened standard, see United States v. Interian-Mata, 363 F. Supp. 2d
1246, 1249 (S.D. Cal. 2005).
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unusual or outstanding equities in his favor, he has no plausible ground for
relief.2 17
D. District Court Responses to the Second and Ninth Circuit Prejudice
Standards
Several of the district courts applying the Second Circuit's or the Ninth
Circuit's prejudice standard have criticized these standards.
1. United States v. Copeland
After the Second Circuit remanded Copeland 11218 for a determination of
whether Copeland had a reasonable probability of relief during his
deportation, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York
responded with a decision (Copeland 111)219 opining that there should be no
prejudice standard. The district court felt uncomfortable with the broad
discretion granted to courts to determine prejudice, arguing that the
"reasonable probability" standard forced courts to do the "nearly
impossible" task of determining what a hypothetical immigration judge
would have decided.220 In Copeland III, the district court proposed that
decisions in cases such as Copeland's should focus not on Strickland's
prejudice requirement, but on "the seriousness of the due process denial."'221
That is, Copeland III argued that courts should decide fundamental
unfairness by a categorical approach rather than an individual approach22 2:
"[A] readily applied-and probably fairer-test would require the
defendant to prove only that his deportation resulted from a due process
denial serious enough to make 'the entry of the [deportation] order...
fundamentally unfair."'' 223 The court explained that the Second Circuit's
order "to take into account actual cases in the context of decisions by [IJs]
and the Board of Immigration Appeals poses a substantial challenge"
because the majority of IJ decisions are unavailable, unless a party seeks
them through discovery.224 Furthermore, the BIA only reviews a small
percentage of the cases heard by IJs.225 "This presents a skewed sample
217. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Valerio, 342 F.3d at 1056-57; Gutierrez-Chavez, 298 F.3d at
825-27.
218. 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004).
219. Copeland 111, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275, 311-12 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
220. See id. at 309-11, 334 ("This is a troubling case, in part because it involves a non-
citizen with a serious criminal record. More troubling still is that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has asked the district court to determine-not what did
happen, or what likely happened-but what might have happened had the defendant been
permitted to seek section 212(c) relief.").
221. Id. at 311.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 278-79 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3) (2000)).
224. Id. at 305.
225. Id.
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because non-citizens satisfied with the results of an [IJ's] decision, in cases
where the government did not seriously object, were never appealed. '226
Despite these criticisms, the Copeland 111 court recognized that it had to
follow the "reasonable probability" standard established by the Second
Circuit. 227 Before deciding whether Copeland met the burden of proving
prejudice, however, the court stated that it would be useful to quantify
Copeland's burden, "given the difficulty of assessing what another
adjudicator would have done when applying complex and subjective
criteria." 22 8  As a result, the court required Copeland to prove that his
probability of obtaining relief was at least twenty percent at the time of his
deportation. 229 The court settled on twenty percent because the number
represents "the approximate inverse of 'clear, unequivocal and convincing
evidence"' and it "represents a sensible and enforceable standard,
considering that deportation often has such serious consequences for the
deportee and his or her family." 230 After balancing the Marin factors, the
court concluded that Copeland had failed to show a "reasonable
probability" of obtaining relief, and the court reinstated his indictment.2 31
2. District Courts in the Ninth Circuit
Like the Copeland 111 court, some district courts in the Ninth Circuit are
critical of applying a prejudice standard to determine whether a failure of
the BIA or an IJ to consider an alien for section 212(c) was fundamentally
unfair. The opinions of these courts have been skeptical of the generosity
of the Ninth Circuit's standard, which requires that the alien only
demonstrate a "plausible ground" for relief. For example, in United States
v. Higareda-Ramirez,232 the district court commented that "[a] showing of
prejudice [under the 'plausible ground' standard] is essentially a
demonstration that the alleged violation affected the outcome of the
proceedings." 233 In United States v. Andrade-Partida,234 the district court
opined,
226. Id.
227. Id. at 312.
228. See id. at 286.
229. Id. at 288.
230. Id. at 287; cf United States v. Russo, No. 02CR482, 2005 WL 1243311, at *9 n.8
(E.D.N.Y. May 25, 2005) ("This court shares the view that the reasonable probability
standard provides district courts with little guidance. This is so both because an alien bears
the burden of demonstrating that his application merits favorable consideration,.., while
leaving the determination to the broad discretion of the IJ, and because of the paucity of
published decisions of Us and the BIA that would aid the court in its analysis.... While the
court is not prepared to opine as to the quantum of proof necessary to establish a reasonable
probability, the court understands defendant's burden to be not insubstantial, requiring more
than a mere plausible claim for relief." (internal quotations omitted)).
231. CopelandIII, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
232. 107 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (D. Haw. 2000).
233. Id. at 1253; see also id. at 1254, 1256 (holding that the defendant was prejudiced
during his deportation order because he had no interpreter or attorney, and because the case's
record was inadequate).
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One can only guess at what might have occurred had the IJ not
neglected his mandatory duty .... The only conclusion that the [c]ourt
can reach with certainty is that the IJ's error deprived defendant of the
opportunity to apply for certain relief, the denial of which may have
created an issue for appeal in federal circuit court. 23 5
In United States v. Saldivar- Vargas,2 36 the court commented that in
following Ninth Circuit precedent, the court "[was] constrained.., to find
that [the defendant] ... was deprived of his right to judicial review because
the IJ failed to inform him that he was entitled to apply for § 212(c)
relief."'23 7 Perhaps as a reaction to the generosity of the "plausible ground"
standard and as a desire to ground their decisions, district courts in the
Ninth Circuit are more prone than appellate courts to consider the Marin
factors when determining prejudice. 238
Part II of this Note has summarized the three different holdings of circuit
courts deciding whether a failure of the BIA or an IJ to consider a
potentially eligible alien for section 212(c) relief is fundamentally unfair
under § 1326(d)(3). Part II has also described some of the negative
reactions of the district courts applying the holdings. Part III of the Note
considers the judicial opinions described above and argues that the Ninth
Circuit offers the best solution: A failure to consider an alien for section
212(c) relief should be fundamentally unfair, so long as the alien can prove
that she had a plausible ground for relief.
III. A FAILURE TO CONSIDER AN ALIEN FOR SECTION 212(c) RELIEF
SHOULD BE FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR, So LONG AS THE ALIEN
DEMONSTRATES A PLAUSIBLE GROUND FOR RELIEF
This Note has focused on whether a failure of the BIA or an IJ to
consider a potentially eligible alien for section 212(c) relief can render a
deportation proceeding fundamentally unfair under § 1326(d)(3). Although
this issue is narrow, it has generated tremendous confusion and
disagreement. Several circuit courts have held that a failure to consider an
alien for section 212(c) relief can never amount to fundamental unfairness
and thus never be a basis for collaterally attacking a deportation order.239
234. 110 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
235. Id. at 1271.
236. 290 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
237. Id. at 1214. In a footnote, the court went on to add as follows: "[A]t oral argument
the government appeared to concede, as it must, that this court is constrained to follow Ninth
Circuit precedent regardless of whether this court agrees with it or whether such precedent
might be altered by the Supreme Court sometime in the future." Id. at 1214 n.3.
238. Compare United States v. Interian-Mata, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1249 (S.D. Cal.
2005), Saldivar-Vargas, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1214, and Andrade-Partida, 110 F. Supp. 2d at
1267 (all using the Marin factors to determine whether the defendant-alien was prejudiced),
with United States v. Aragon-Aviles, No. 03-50327, 2005 WL 2250763, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept.
16, 2005), United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 2004), and
United States v. Jimenez-Marmolejo, 104 F.3d 1083, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 1996) (all not using
the Marin factors to determine whether the defendant-alien was prejudiced).
239. See supra Part II.A.
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The Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit disagree with this stance, both
holding that a failure to consider an alien for relief can be fundamentally
unfair, so long as the alien demonstrates that the failure was prejudicial.
Furthermore, the Second and Ninth Circuits disagree with each other about
the requirements of the prejudice standard.240 Part III of this Note makes
two arguments. First, Part III.A posits that a failure to consider an alien for
section 212(c) relief can be fundamentally unfair, so long as the alien
proves that she was prejudiced by this failure. Second, Part III.B argues
that the Ninth Circuit's prejudice standard is the most workable: An alien's
burden for demonstrating prejudice should require her to show that she had
a "plausible ground" for section 212(c) relief.24 1
A. A Failure to Consider an Alien for Section 212(c) Relief Can Be
Fundamentally Unfair
When an alien collaterally attacks her original deportation order, a court
must determine whether the alien meets the requirements of § 1326(d)(1),
(2), and (3).242 If the alien argues that the BIA or an IJ improperly failed to
consider her for section 212(c) relief, and if the alien satisfies § 1326(d)(1)
and (2), the court then has the discretion to decide whether the BIA or IJ's
failure was "fundamentally unfair" under § 1326(d)(3). A majority of the
circuits to rule on this issue have held that a failure to consider an alien for
section 212(c) relief cannot be fundamentally unfair. As Part II.A of this
Note discussed above, the basis for their decisions is a particular
interpretation of section 212(c), one that views the statute as a "legislative
grace" granting the Attorney General and his agents broad discretion to
decide whether to grant relief from deportation to an alien. The majority
circuits maintain that in light of this broad discretion, a failure to consider
an alien for section 212(c) relief can never be fundamentally unfair because
the statute does not establish a liberty or property right deserving due
process protection. The majority circuits' instinct seems to be that due
process does not protect a benefit that is entirely discretionary. As the
scholar D.J. Galligan observed,
There may be... difficulties in making rights dependent upon
discretionary assessments.... [A]s the discretionary element widens, the
value of the right is reduced; there may even come a point where its
content is so dependent on discretionary assessments that the very coinage
of rights is debased. 243
240. See supra Part II.B and II.C for summaries of the Second Circuit's and Ninth
Circuit's holdings, respectively.
241. For a description of the Ninth Circuit's prejudice standard, see supra notes 196-203
and accompanying text. For an argument that the Second Circuit's prejudice standard is the
correct approach, see Wible, supra note 70, at 485-92.
242. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
243. D.J. Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion 192
(1986).
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Nevertheless, the majority circuits' interpretation misses a critical
distinction between the right to section 212(c) relief itself (here, undeniably
discretionary) and the right to be considered for the relief, which the
Supreme Court in another context has held potentially protected by a due
process interest even where the relief itself is not. The Supreme Court's
decision in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional
Complex244 indicates that although someone may have only a "mere hope"
in the exercise of discretionary relief, consideration for that relief may
become protected by due process if other statutes so mandate. Greenholtz
held that a Nebraska statute could elevate consideration for parole from a
mere hope to a due process right.245  The majority circuits should
acknowledge that federal statutes, BIA precedent, and Supreme Court
holdings similarly elevated consideration for section 212(c) relief from an
exercise of unguided discretion to a mandatory, established liberty interest
so important to deportable aliens that it deserves due process protection.246
Therefore, as the Second and Ninth Circuits hold, a failure of the BIA or an
U to consider a potentially eligible alien for section 212(c) relief can be
fundamentally unfair under § 1326(d)(3). 247
The first factor elevating consideration for section 212(c) relief from a
mere hope to an established liberty interest is federal legislation. Although
section 212(c) clearly granted discretionary power to the Attorney General,
Congress did not make the consideration of relief discretionary: Under 8
C.F.R. § 242.17(a) (repealed in 1998) and § 212.3(e)(1), an U had a duty to
inform an alien of any right to discretionary relief and thereafter conduct a
hearing to determine whether to grant that relief if requested.248 Congress
did not place further limits on the Attorney General's discretion, but a
second factor did: the BIA's decision in Matter of Marin,249 which
provided guidelines for the Attorney General's agents exercising his
discretion. Consideration of the Marin factors was an established procedure
244. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
245. Id. at 12 ("We can accept respondents' view that the expectancy of release provided
in this statute is entitled to some measure of constitutional protection."); see supra notes
155-58 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit's interpretation of Greenholtz in
United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 2004)).
246. For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions besides Greenholtz that distinguish a
right to consideration for relief from a favorable exercise of that relief, see Wible, supra note
70, at 486-88 (discussing Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956); United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954)).
247. For a discussion of the Second and Ninth Circuits' holdings, see supra Part II.B and
II.C, respectively.
248. See Copeland If, 376 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2004). Congress has "sweeping power to
enact retroactive laws," but as counsel for St. Cyr noted during oral arguments before the
Supreme Court, "this power [is] all the more reason to apply the Court's rigorous clear
statement rule before imposing a harsh retroactive consequence." Morawetz, supra note 82,
at 303.
249. 16 1. & N. Dec. 581 (B.I.A. 1978).
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and acted as a limit on the arbitrariness of the Attorney General's
discretionary power.250
The third factor elevating consideration for section 212(c) relief to an
established liberty interest is Supreme Court decisions. Both Mendoza-
Lopez25 1 and St. Cyr 252 protected the rights of aliens, and these decisions
indicate that consideration for section 212(c) relief is a protected due
process right. Mendoza-Lopez is frequently cited for its general warning
that courts should nullify deportation orders based on procedural errors "so
fundamental that they may functionally deprive the alien of judicial
review." 253 This case also held, however, that fairness during deportation
proceedings requires considering an alien for any possible discretionary
relief.254 The defendants in Mendoza-Lopez were indicted for illegal
reentry and argued that they should be allowed to collaterally attack their
original deportations. 255 The aliens had two bases for their attack: An U
had inadequately advised them about obtaining counsel, and the U had
failed to obtain knowing waivers of the aliens' right to apply for a type of
discretionary relief called "suspension of deportation." 256  After
determining that the aliens could collaterally attack their deportation order,
the Court held that
250. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (discussing the Marin factors). To
understand how federal statutes and BIA precedent limited the discretionary aspect of
section 212(c) relief to make consideration for it an established right, it is useful to compare
another form of discretionary relief, the presidential pardon power. See U.S. Const. art. 11, §
2, cl. 1 ("The President shall.., have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses
against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."). The President's power to
pardon is almost completely discretionary: The only mandatory limits are the Constitution's
provisions that (1) the President possesses this power and (2) the power cannot be used to
pardon an impeachment. See Paul J. Haase, Note, "Oh My Darling Clemency": Existing or
Possible Limitations on the Use of the Presidential Pardon Power, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
1287, 1292-93 (2002). Congress has attempted to provide some limits on the President's
pardoning power, see, e.g., 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.35-.36 (2005); 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.10 (2005), but
these limits are advisory rather than mandatory. Haase, supra, at 1298. Thus, "a pardon
'need not satisfy any strict legal set of requirements, [a pardon] can be [granted] for no
reason at all or for a coin flip, and in the end [a pardon] rests upon the exercise of boundless
discretion."' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting L. Anthony Sutin, If Only You Asked: Trust
the Pardon Review Process, Jurist, Mar. 19, 2001, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pardonop6.htm.).
No one could reasonably argue that he or she is entitled to a presidential pardon and that a
failure to consider someone for a presidential pardon amounts to "fundamental unfairness."
This is precisely because there is no statutory or customary guidance for, or limits on, the
presidential pardon power. In contrast, the Attorney General's discretionary power had to
operate within the bounds of section 212(c)'s language, 8 C.F.R § 242.17(a), 8 C.F.R. §
212.3(e)(1), and the factors enumerated in Matter of Marin. The establishment of such
requirements indicates that our government took consideration for section 212(c) relief very
seriously and that the consideration was an established right deserving due process
protection.
251. 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
252. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
253. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 839 n.17.
254. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text (describing Mendoza-Lopez).
255. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 831.
256. Id. "Suspension of deportation," which was codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a), was very
similar to section 212(c) relief. See id. at 831 n.3.
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[b]ecause respondents were deprived of their rights to appeal, and of
any basis to appeal since the only relief for which they would have been
eligible was not adequately explained to them, the deportation proceeding
in which these events occurred may not be used to support a criminal
conviction, and the dismissal of the indictments against them was
therefore proper.
257
In other words, the Court explicitly recognized in Mendoza-Lopez that if an
alien was deprived of judicial review and was not considered for possible
relief from deportation, her indictment could not survive. The Court's
holding thus indicates that a failure to consider a potentially eligible alien
for section 212(c) relief can be a fundamentally unfair procedural error
justifying a collateral attack on a deportation order.258
The Supreme Court's decision in St. Cyr similarly indicates that a failure
to consider an alien for section 212(c) relief can be fundamentally unfair.2 59
At the beginning of its opinion, the Court characterizes St. Cyr's
entitlement to consideration for relief as "a substantive [question],
concerning the impact of [the 1996 Amendments] on conduct that occurred
before their enactment and on the availability of discretionary relief from
deportation." 260 The Court highlighted the importance of consideration for
section 212(c) relief by discussing the basic unfairness of retroactively
eliminating that relief.26 1 The Court posited that retroactive application of
IIRIRA would be a "new disability" to aliens such as St. Cyr who entered
into plea agreements in reliance of the availability of section 212(c) relief
and that "[t]he potential for unfairness ... is significant and manifest. 2 62
As the Second Circuit noted in Copeland II, such assertions stand for the
proposition that eligibility for section 212(c) relief cannot be lightly
revoked. 263 Furthermore, St. Cyr clearly stated that the discretionary nature
of section 212(c) does not belittle its importance:
[T]he fact that § 212(c) relief is discretionary does not affect the propriety
of our conclusion. There is a clear difference, for the purposes of
retroactivity analysis, between facing possible deportation and facing
certain deportation. Prior to AEDPA and IIRIRA, aliens like St. Cyr had
a significant likelihood of receiving § 212(c) relief.... [R]espondent, and
other aliens like him, almost certainly relied upon that likelihood .... 
264
Reliance on section 212(c) relief, and not the statute's discretionary nature,
was thus determinative in the Court's holding that section 212(c) relief
remains available to aliens like St. Cyr. Aliens presently indicted for illegal
257. Id. at 842.
258. See Gerald P. Seipp, Defense of INA § 276 Reentry After Removal Prosecutions-
Circuit Confusion on the Collateral Attack Defense, Immigr. Briefings, July 2004, at 1.
259. See supra notes 113-29 and accompanying text (discussing St. Cyr).
260. INS v. St Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 292-93 (2001).
261. See supra notes 125-29 (discussing St. Cyr's fairness analysis).
262. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323.
263. Copeland 11, 376 F.3d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 2004); see also supra note 185 and
accompanying text (discussing this point).
264. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 325.
2006] 2841
FORDHAMLA W REVIEW
reentry, however, may have equally relied on section 212(c) relief,265 and
the fact that these individuals have reentered the country without
permission makes their earlier deportation orders no fairer than St. Cyr's.
Courts should not be allowed to eliminate the consideration for relief that
St. Cyr guaranteed simply because an alien's eligibility for section 212(c)
relief is litigated at date later than her original deportation. St. Cyr, along
with Mendoza-Lopez, represents the Supreme Court's view that
consideration for section 212(c) relief is not a haphazard, unguided "grace,"
but an established procedure of incredible importance to aliens. Depriving
an alien of the opportunity to seek relief should thus be "fundamentally
unfair" under § 1326(d)(3), if-as discussed below-the alien proves that
she was prejudiced by the failure.
B. Demonstrating a "Plausible Ground"for Relief Is the Proper Prejudice
Standard
The Second and Ninth Circuits properly found that a failure of the BIA or
an IJ to consider an alien for section 212(c) relief can be fundamentally
unfair.266 Both courts maintain that a collaterally attacking alien proves
fundamental unfairness only if she was prejudiced by the failure. The
Second Circuit held that an alien demonstrates prejudice if she shows that
she had a "reasonable probability" of receiving relief from deportation.267
The Ninth Circuit held that an alien demonstrates prejudice by showing that
she had a "plausible ground" for relief.26 8 Part III.B.1 argues that despite
the criticisms of the district courts applying the Second or Ninth Circuits'
prejudice standards, some standard is necessary. Part III.B.2 argues that a
collaterally attacking alien should bear a burden of showing prejudice and
that this burden should require the alien to meet the Ninth Circuit's
"plausible ground" prejudice standard.
1. The Justification for a Prejudice Standard, Despite the Criticisms of
Several District Court Opinions
Although several district courts have been critical of applying a prejudice
standard to collateral attacks such as Richard Copeland's, 269 aliens should
continue to bear some prejudice burden. The government and society
would pay a high cost if aliens who were statutorily ineligible for section
212(c) relief or who had a miniscule chance of relief had their indictments
265. Cf Morawetz, supra note 82, at 302 (describing an amicus brief filed on behalf of
St. Cyr that "provided specific evidence of how criminal defense lawyers were trained to
consider eligibility for 212(c) relief when negotiating a plea agreement").
266. See supra Part II.B-C (discussing the Second Circuit's and Ninth Circuit's holdings,
respectively).
267. See supra notes 187-95 and accompanying text (describing the Second Circuit's
prejudice standard).
268. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit's
prejudice standard).
269. See supra Part II.D (discussing these criticisms).
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for illegal reentry automatically dismissed. Such dismissals would waste
the considerable time and money already spent on prosecuting the aliens, as
well as risk exculpating dangerous persons who deserve criminal sanctions.
Therefore, federal courts should act as a filter, distinguishing aliens who
had meritorious cases for section 212(c) relief from those who had no
chance of relief. Furthermore, because an alien's burden of proving
prejudice will require presenting factors in her favor,270 a determination of
prejudice by a federal court will allow an alien with a sympathetic case
more time to collect and prepare evidence for any future immigration
proceedings.2 71
270. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (describing the Marin factors).
271. Although an alien may demonstrate prejudice and convince a federal court to vacate
her indictment for illegal reentry, it is not certain that she will ultimately receive section
212(c) relief. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), the federal government can reinstate an alien's
prior deportation order "[i]f the Attorney General finds that [the] alien has reentered the
United States illegally after having been removed." 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2000). Title
eight, section 241.8 of the Code of Federal Regulations further describes how an alien has
"no right to a hearing before an immigration judge in such circumstances" and how the
reinstatement of the prior deportation order requires an "immigration officer" to make
certain findings. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 (2005). The Code of Federal Regulations allows an alien
to submit an oral or written statement contesting an immigration officer's decision to
reinstate a deportation, but the Code does not require the officer to determine whether the
prior deportation order was fair or whether the alien should have been considered for some
form of discretionary relief. See id. In fact, 8 U.S.C. § 123 l(a)(5) commands that "the prior
order of removal ... is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, [and] the alien is not
eligible and may not apply for any relief under this chapter." 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(5). As a
result, if a federal court in a criminal proceeding finds that an alien's prior deportation order
was "fundamentally unfair" and vacates her indictment for illegal reentry, the federal
government could reinstate that same deportation order despite the court's fairness
determination and proceed with a civil deportation. In light of the federal government's
reinstatement power, an alien has limited options if she seeks section 212(c) relief after a
court dismisses her indictment for illegal reentry. If an immigration officer reinstates the
prior deportation order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(5), the alien could submit a statement
to the officer citing the federal court's determination that the prior deportation order was
"fundamentally unfair." If the immigration officer declines to reverse the reinstatement, the
alien could then appeal the reinstatement to the Court of Appeals for that jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, under the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (codified
as amended in various sections of 2, 8, 10, 12, 22, 28, 30, 33, 37, 38, 40, 42 U.S.C.), the
alien's claims on appeal are limited and the alien's burden of persuasion is significant. For
example, Ramirez-Molina v. Ziglar, No. 03-50596, 2006 WL 62862 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2006),
describes how the REAL ID Act limits an alien to asserting only constitutional or legal
claims when appealing a reinstatement order and describes how the Fifth Circuit further
requires an alien to show that she exhausted her administrative remedies and that her initial
deportation order was a gross miscarriage of justice, id. at *4. An alien in the Ninth Circuit
has an additional option, however. In 2004, the Ninth Circuit invalidated 8 C.F.R. § 241.8,
holding that the section's provisions were ultra vires to INA § 240(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)
(2000), which requires that "[a]n immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding
the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien." Morales-lzquierdo v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d
1299, 1302-04 (9th Cir. 2004); cf Dinnall v. Gonzalez, 421 F.3d 247, 253 n.9 (3d Cir. 2005)
(noting the Ninth Circuit's holding in Morales-Izquierdo). When a reinstatement hearing
within the Ninth Circuit takes place before an IJ, the alien could collaterally attack the prior
deportation order. During the hearing, however, the alien would have to demonstrate that
"the prior order resulted in a gross miscarriage of justice." See Roman, 19 1. & N. Dec. 855,
856-57 (B.I.A. 1988) ("[A]n alien may collaterally attack a final order of exclusion or
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2. Why the Prejudice Standard Should Require an Alien to Demonstrate a
Plausible Ground for Relief
As discussed above, when an alien indicted in federal court for criminal
illegal reentry collaterally attacks her deportation based on a failure of the
BIA or an IJ to consider her for section 212(c) relief, the federal court
should determine whether the alien was prejudiced. 272 The purpose of the
court's determination is to distinguish aliens who at least had a chance of
receiving section 212(c) relief from those who had no chance of relief and
should remain indicted.273 Consistent with this purpose, federal courts
should apply the prejudice standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit: An
alien should only have to demonstrate that she had a plausible ground for
receiving section 212(c) relief.274  As noted by the district court in
Copeland III, the determination of prejudice along any standard requires
that a federal judge step into the shoes of a hypothetical IJ sitting before the
passage of the 1996 Amendments. 275 Several district courts have voiced
concerns about this task,276 but so long as district courts must filter the
aliens' cases to conserve judicial and administrative resources, the standard
applied by the courts should be the least burdensome on both the courts and
aliens. This seems to be the implication behind Copeland III's attempt to
quantify prejudice as a showing that the alien had at least a twenty percent
chance of receiving relief from deportation.277 The Copeland III court
realized that because aliens with meritorious cases have already suffered an
improper decision during their deportations, fairness to such aliens requires
a low prejudice burden.278 Although the "plausible ground" standard is a
generous standard, considerations such as statutory ineligibility and the
"unusual or outstanding equities" doctrine will minimize the extent to
which federal judges must act as hypothetical immigration judges.279 In
sum, a prejudice standard requiring an alien to show a plausible ground for
relief is the most efficient standard for conserving judicial and
administrative resources and for exculpating aliens who were unfairly
denied consideration for deportation relief.
deportation in a subsequent deportation proceeding only if she can show that the prior order
resulted in a gross miscarriage ofjustice.").
272. See supra Part III.B.1.
273. See id.
274. For a description of the Ninth Circuit's prejudice standard, see supra note 202 and
accompanying text.
275. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
276. See supra Part II.D (discussing the district courts' criticisms).
277. See supra notes 227-31 and accompanying text.
278. Copeland III, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286-88 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); see supra notes 219-31
and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 96, 212-17 and accompanying text (discussing the "unusual or
outstanding equities" doctrine).
2844 [Vol. 74
GONE BUT NOT FORGOTTEN
CONCLUSION
Section 212(c) was incredibly important to deportable aliens because it
provided an opportunity for relief from deportation. Federal laws,280 BIA
precedent,28' and Supreme Court decisions282 have all recognized how
numerous aliens came to rely on this relief to remain in the United States.
If the BIA or an IJ failed to consider an alien for section 212(c) relief and
the alien is subsequently indicted for illegal reentry, the court presiding
over the prosecution for illegal reentry should determine whether the alien
had a plausible ground for relief at the time of her deportation. If so, the
indictment for illegal reentry should be thrown out, for the courts should not
condone a conviction that relies on a flawed administrative proceeding. To
allow such a conviction is fundamentally unfair, regardless of the
defendant's citizenship status.
280. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 251-65 and accompanying text.
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